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Case No. 20060190-SC

Defendants/Appellees.
APPELLEE'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(a), UTAH CODE ANN.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Did a unanimous Court of Appeals and the distinguished trial judge correctly rule that
the vote of an over whelming majority of property owners on January 1, 2004 terminated the
restrictive covenants of the Quail Lakes Subdivision?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On two separate occasions a majority of the property owners of the Quail Lakes
Subdivision in Sandy, Utah voted to terminate the restrictive covenants which had been
recorded by the developers in 1973. Following the first vote, which occurred in the fall of

1997, Barbara and David Swenson ("the Swensons") appealed to this Court which ruled in
Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT. 16 {Swenson 1) that the vote occurred too early. In the
second instance, which occurred on January 1, 2004, the Swensons appealed to the Court of
Appeals which held unanimously in Swenson v. Erickson, 2006 UT. App. 34 {Swenson 2)
that the vote was proper and the covenants were terminated. Unhappy with the results, the
Swensons obtained a writ of certiorari to review from this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On July 9, 1973, restrictive covenants for the Quail Point Subdivision were

filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder. The covenants were to run with the land "until
January 1, 1994, at which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive
periods of 10 years unless by vote of a majority of the then owners of the building sites
covered by these covenants, it is agreed to change said covenants in whole or part."
2.

In 1997, Dave Erickson ("Erickson") began building a structure on his

property to be used as a storage and hobby shed. The Swensons filed suit in the Third
District Court alleging that Erickson's shed violated the restrictive covenants and obtained an
injunction prohibiting him from maintaining the shed on his property.
3.

After the injunction was entered, the subdivision residents voted

overwhelmingly to terminate the covenants. A notice of termination was recorded on
October 6, 1997. The trial court dismissed the case and the Swensons aippealed.
2

4.

On appeal, this Court held in Swenson 1 that the attempt by the home owners

to terminate the covenants was ineffective since the covenants specifically provided that
they could be changed by a majority vote of subdivision lot owners only at specific ten year
intervals.
5.

The case was remanded to the District Court and a permanent injunction was

entered on August 31,2000 prohibiting Erickson from keeping the shed on his lot.
6.

Erickson promptly removed the shed.

7.

Commencing in December 2003 with a neighborhood meeting and

culminating with a vote on January 1, 2004, 42 out of 52 lots and 76 out of 90 lot owners
voted to terminate the covenants. A Notice of Termination was recorded on March 26, 2004
with the Salt Lake County Recorder (R. 59).
8.

The Swensons participated in the neighborhood meeting and the election,

campaigned against termination, were present the entire time the votes were cast and even
suggested the time of the vote (12 noon to 2:00 p.m. on January 1, 2004), all without voicing
any objection to the proceedings.
9.

Neither Erickson or Dave Limberg ("Limberg") were in the process of

constructing any shed or improvement on their lots; nevertheless, the Swensons singled them
out as the sole defendants in this litigation merely because their properties abut (R. 59).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The covenants do not provide that they are automatically renewed at 12:01 a.m. on
January 1st; rather, they allow modification by a majority of the lot owaers on that date. The
lot owners followed the previous directions from this Court and voted on January 1, 2004 to
terminate the covenants. The Swensons1 strained interpretation of the covenant language is
not reasonable, workable or supported by case law.
ARGUMENT
I
SWENSONS' INTERPRETATION OF THE COVENANTS IS FLAWED
The Swensons continually argue that the covenants were automatically extended at
12:01 a.m. on January 1, 2004. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, however, the
covenants contain no such language. Had the drafters so chosen, the covenants could have
provided a strict time line for renewal, but they do not.
The Swensons misconstrue the decision of this Court in Swenson 1. There, this
Court stated that the covenants were "due" for extension on January 1, 2004, not that they
were automatically renewed at 12:01 a.m. The word "due" means expected or scheduled,
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S SCHOOL AND OFFICE DICTIONARY,

2d ed. 2002; thus, the

covenants were scheduled or expected to be extended sometime on January 1, 2004, unless
the home owners took some action. The home owners acted.

4

The Swensons also ignore other critical language of the covenants. The covenants
are to run until January 1, 1994 "at which time" they will be automatically extended unless
"the then owners of the building lots" (emphasis added) agree to change the covenants.
Read simply, "at which time" obviously refers to January 1st. The phrase, "the then owners
of building lots" also obviously refers to January 1st. If the vote must be taken by those who
own lots on January 1st, it seems compelling that a vote on January 1st is proper.
In Swenson 7, this Court cited the covenants with emphasis as follows:
looking at the plain language of the article, the covenants are to be "automatically
extended . . . unless by a vote of a majority of the then owners" (emphasis by the
Court).
This Court held that even if the petition from the home owners represented a majority of the
lot owners at the time (which it did), it was still invalid because it occurred too soon. In
other words, it was not the action of the "then owners," i.e. those that owned lots when the
covenants were due for extension or, in other words, on January 1, 2004.l
This Court went on to state:
Therefore, the owners have the power to amend the covenants, but only at such time
as the covenants are due for extension. The last such time was January 1, 1994. We
assume that the next such time will be on January 1, 2004 (emphasis added).

1

In Swenson 7, the Swensons argued that the vote should be rejected because there could
be a change in property ownership before January 1,2004 and, therefore, the vote that occurred
was not the vote of the "then" property owners.
5

Significantly, the Court did not say that the covenants could be amended "around,"
"immediately prior to," or "shortly before" January 1,2004 or that they were due for renewal
at 9 lA or 9 3A year intervals; rather, this Court said that the covenants could only be amended
when they were due for extension and the next time was on January 1, 2004.
The Quail Point neighbors took the Court at its word and voted on January 1, 2004 to
terminate the covenants. The neighbors could have voted any time, but chose January 1st
believing that was what they were required to do by this Court. Now they find themselves
once again embroiled in an appeal fostered by the Swensons.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION SHOULD BE UPHELD
A common issue in cases of this type is "how far in advance of the renewal date can
covenants be changed?" Is one week prior permissible? How about six months? In
Swenson 7, this Court said the vote had to occur on January 1, 2004. The Court of Appeals
agreed. This position is supported by the Oklahoma court in Wallace's Fourth Southmoor
Addition v. Rogers, 874 P.2d 818 (Okl. App. 1994) The covenants in that case were similar
to those here, they provided:
"These covenants are to run with the land and shall be binding on all parties and all
persons claiming under them until January 1, 1974, at which time said covenants
shall be automatically extended for successive periods often years unless by a vote
of a majority of the then owners of the lots, it is agreed to change said covenants in
whole or in part."
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A developer obtained the vote of a majority of the lot owners modifying the
covenants in early 1993 - approximately a year before the covenants were to be extended.
The trial court rejected the modification and held that any amendment, unless the vote is
unanimous, must take place at ten year intervals, with the next being on January 1, 1994.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Swensons1 argument that the covenants were both terminated and renewed on
the same day, or that the decision of the Court of Appeals pushed the renewal date to
January 2nd, is without merit. Simply put, unless the home owners take some affirmative
action on the renewal date, the covenants are renewed. If the home owners take proper
action on the renewal date, the covenants are not renewed.
If the Swensons' interpretation is correct and the covenants were extended at 12:01
a.m., the lot owners are placed in an impossible position. Since they cannot amend the
covenants until they are "due" for extension (January 1st according to Swenson 1) and they
must have a vote of those who own lots on January 1st, they must meet and vote at the stroke
of midnight on December 31st or loose the opportunity to modify the covenants for 10 years,
when they will have to again try to meet and vote at midnight, ad infinitum. Thus, there will
be no effective way to modify the covenants absent a unanimous vote.
The cases cited by Swenson relate primarily to the "how far in advance" question and
are inapposite to the issue here. In City ofGulfport v. Wilson, 603 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1992),

7

for instance, the residents of a subdivision filed an amendment to the covenants
approximately six months prior to the time the covenants were to be automatically extended.
The court there held that the vote was not premature and the amendment was binding. The
court stated that it was "reasonable" for amendments to be voted on and to be ratified before
the expiration of the ten year period so that the covenants would not automatically go into
effect for another ten years. The court did not state, however, that the vote could not occur
on the renewal date.
The cases of Pearce v. Scarcello, 920 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1996) and Scholten v.
Blackhawk Partners, 999 P.2d 393 (Ariz. App. 1995) also cited by Plaintiff similarly deal
with votes to amend covenants that occurred prior to the renewal date. In Pearce, the court
held that a vote held apparently several years before the expiration of the extension period
would not become effective until the 10 year extension period had expired. In Scholten, the
court allowed an amendment approved by a majority 7 lA years before the expiration of the
10 year renewal period to become effective at the start of the next successive period. In
Swenson 1, however, this Court rejected an amendment that was approved by a majority of
the Quail Point home owners about 6 Vi years before the expiration of the first 10 year
renewal period; thus, Swensons? cases appear to be contrary to Utah law.
One case would appear to support the Swensons at first blush, Failla v. Meaux, 237
So.2d 688 (La. App. 1970). A careful reading of the case, however, shows that it is not

8

helpful to their cause. In that case the trial court stated, in dicta, that "had defendant waited
until January 1, 1966 to amend the 1950 dedication, the effective date of the amendment
would be January 1, 1976." This Court in Swenson 7, however, rejected the notion that an
amendment to covenants can be filed 6 14 years before they are due for extension. Surely,
therefore, this Court would reject the notion that an amendment can be filed 10 years in
advance. As a result, the fundamental premiss underlying the Louisiana court's decision has
already been rejected by this Court.
Ill
THE COMMON MEANING OF CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE SHOULD
GUIDE THIS COURT IN DETERMINING THE INTENT
OF THE PARTIES
The Court should determine "the parties" intentions from the plain meaning of the
contractual language as a matter of law. Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. American Hous.
Partners, Inc., 94 P.3d 292 (2004 UT). The Swensons focus on an obscure technical timing
of the vote in hopes of distorting the plain language of the covenants and frustrating the
desires of the lot owners. Erickson and Limberg urge the Court to not interpret the language
in Article XIV in such a restrictive manner by requiring a vote prior to January 1, 2004,
since such requirements were not stated in the covenants nor intended by the drafters. See,
Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 621-22 (1912) (courts must give the
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language found in an agreement its ordinary and usual meaning when applied to the subjectmatter and nature of the agreement and apparent object or purpose of the parties) and Daly
v. Old, 35 Utah 74, 99 P. 460, 463 (1909) (courts will always incline towards giving
language a reasonable construction, and will avoid, if possible, an absurdity if the language
is susceptible of some other meaning). Swensonsf interpretation of Article XIV suits their
own purpose and is not reasonable. A more reasoned and ordinary interpretation of Article
XIV would allow the lot owners to amend or terminate the covenants on January 1, 2004, as
this Court previously directed.
Swensons hammer on the word "until" and contend that it means that the covenants
automatically renewed at 12:01 a.m and that the home owners' vote had to occur before
January 1st. Erickson and Limberg suggest otherwise. It is contrary to common usage and
understanding to contend, as Swenson do, that the word "until" excludes the date mentioned.
Thus, if someone is told they have "until Thursday," for instance, to do a chore, submit a
brief, return a borrowed item, or perform any other act, common usage dictates that the act
can be accomplished on Thursday. The Swensons would contend, however, under their
interpretation of the word "until," that the act must have been accomplished by Wednesday.
Common usage also dictates that "until the 1st" means that the act can be performed on the
1st.
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CONCLUSION
The residents of the Quail Lakes Subdivision have tried for almost 9 years to
terminate the covenants that were filed over 33 years ago. They thought they were
scrupulously following the directions of this Court by voting on January 1, 2004. After all,
this Court told the residents that the covenants could only be amended when they were due
for extension and that the next such time would be on January 1, 2004. To now hold that the
residents acted too late would create an unjust and unworkable result which would make it
virtually impossible to amend covenants one they are enacted.
DATED this<?GWday of July, 2006.

JJ

'mwJPii&A

J. Thomas Bowen
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